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CHRIS ERCHULL

NOTES
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE—A CONSTITUTIONAL
BARRIER TO SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND THE LOCAL FOOD
MOVEMENT
Better food—more local, more healthy, more sensible—is a
powerful new topic of the American conversation. It reaches from
the epicurean quarters of Slow Food convivia to the matter-of-fact
Surgeon General’s Office; from Farm Aid concerts to school lunch
programs. From the rural routes to the inner cities, we are staring at
our plates and wondering where that’s been. For the first time since
our nation’s food was ubiquitously local, the point of origin now
matters again to some consumers. We’re increasingly wary of an
industry that puts stuff in our dinner we can’t identify as animal,
1
vegetable, mineral, or what.

INTRODUCTION
As sustainable agriculture2 has become increasingly popular, many
state and local governments have joined the movement by creating Food
Policy Councils in an effort to promote sustainable practices in food

1. BARBARA KINGSOLVER WITH STEVEN L. HOPP & CAMILLE KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL,
VEGETABLE, MIRACLE 17 (2007).
2. Congress defines sustainable agriculture as:
an integrated system of plant and animal production practices having a site-specific
application that will, over the long-term—
(A) satisfy human food and fiber needs;
(B) enhance environmental quality and the natural resource base upon which the
agriculture economy depends;
(C) make the most efficient use of nonrenewable resources and on-farm resources
and integrate, where appropriate, natural biological cycles and controls;
(D) sustain the economic viability of farm operations; and
(E) enhance the quality of life for farmers and society as a whole.
7 U.S.C. § 3103(19) (2006). For more information on the history and use of the term in a
regulatory context, see Mary V. Gold, Sustainable Agriculture: Information Access Tools,
USDA NAT’L AGRIC. LIB. (July 18, 2012), http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/agnic/sus
ag.shtml.
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production.3 There is a great need for governmental support and
encouragement of the sustainable agriculture movement because there
are serious environmental and economic problems that have arisen due
to the industrialization of agriculture over the past several decades.4 The
federal government has long supported industrial practices in
agriculture, and it is unlikely that a sudden shift in federal policy is on
the horizon.5
State governments have an important interest in
encouraging sustainable food production on a local level.6
A constitutional doctrine known as the dormant Commerce Clause
stands in the way of states wishing to promote sustainable agriculture.7
As an implied negative aspect of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution,8 courts use the dormant Commerce Clause to
strike down state actions that interfere with interstate commerce.9 To
test10 whether a state act is invalid under this doctrine, courts first
determine if the act is discriminatory on its face,11 in its purpose,12 or in
its effect.13 If it is found to be discriminatory against out-of-state
3. See CFSC LIST OF FOOD POLICY COUNCILS IN NORTH AMERICA, 1-67 (May 2012),
available
at
http://www.markwinne.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/fp-councils-may2012.pdf. The burgeoning Food Policy Councils may look to resources such as this Note and
the Good Laws, Good Food Toolkit for guidance in implementing policies that will promote
sustainable agriculture in their communities. See THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FOOD LAW
AND POLICY CLINIC, GOOD LAWS, GOOD FOOD: PUTTING STATE FOOD POLICY TO WORK
FOR OUR COMMUNITIES (2012).
4. See infra note 27.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part I.D.
7. Other potential constitutional barriers exist, but they are outside the scope of this
Note.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (explaining that the reason the
Constitution gives complete authority over interstate commerce to Congress is “to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation”).
10. Note that there is not agreement on whether a clear test has been employed by
courts. In fact, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has been criticized for its unpredictability.
See Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 221 (1997) (“[I]t might be well for courts to ask
whether current tests serve as accurate shortcuts for imputing either protectionist or
nonprotectionist effect to legislative enactments.”).
11. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (1979) (explaining that “facial discrimination by itself may
be a fatal defect”).
12. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977) (inferring
that the discriminatory impact of a statute “was not an unintended byproduct” but rather the
motivation for state legislators).
13. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (explaining that
discriminatory effect can be sufficient to compel dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny). See
Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
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interests, it is considered “virtually per se invalid,”14 and then may be
upheld only if the legislation substantially serves a legitimate state
interest and there is no less discriminatory alternative to achieve the
local goal.15 Economic protectionism is the presumed motivation behind
discriminatory legislation, and it is always an impermissible intention.16
If an act is not discriminatory, but it nonetheless interferes with interstate
commerce, a balancing test is used to establish constitutionality by
determining whether the out-of-state burdens outweigh the in-state
benefits.17 Despite the chilling effect of this doctrine that limits the
ability of state governments to experiment with sustainability where
interstate commercial activity is involved, it is likely that legislation, if
carefully crafted to support sustainable agriculture, can survive
constitutional challenges.18
Part I of this Note will discuss the goals of the sustainable
agriculture movement and how they relate to federalism. Part I.A will
1203, 1239-45 (1986) (describing the three types of discrimination recognized by courts).
14. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994) (“‘[D]iscrimination’ simply means different treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce
is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.”).
15. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353-54. See also Smith, supra note 13, at 1231 (“It is settled
Supreme Court doctrine that if a regulation is discriminatory, the state bears the burden of
justifying it. First, the state must prove that it has a legitimate interest to be served by the
regulation. Second, it must show that the regulation serves this interest to a substantial extent.
Third, it must prove that it has no available alternatives to the regulation that are less
discriminatory.”). There is a major exception under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
that applies to situations in which a state is acting as a market participant, but the exception is
beyond the scope of this Note. See South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
82, 93 (1984) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a
market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities.”). This
exception applies to local procurement statutes that compel state organizations to prefer food
produced within the state when making purchases. See Amy S. Ackerman, Buy Healthy, Buy
Local: An Analysis of Potential Legal Challenges to State and Local Government Local
Purchase Preferences, 43 URB. LAW. 1015, 1019-22 (2011) (discussing how the market
participant exception applies to state procurement statutes that favor local sourcing).
16. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949) (“[A] state may
not promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate
commerce.”); cf. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626-27 (“[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in
legislative means as well as legislative ends . . . . we assume [each state] has every right to
protect its residents’ pocketbooks as well as their environment . . . [b]ut whatever [the State’s]
ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce
coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently.”).
17. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
18. See infra Part III.
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define sustainable agriculture, while Part I.B will show how federal
regulation and industrial agriculture are closely connected. Part I.C will
discuss the relationship between small farms and sustainability. Part I.D
will argue that many of the problems addressed by the sustainable
agriculture movement fall within the police power of local and state
governments. Part II will analyze the relationship between the dormant
Commerce Clause and the movement towards agricultural sustainability.
Part II.A will explain how the dormant Commerce Clause treats state
policies with respect to agriculture, and then Part II.B will compare how
the doctrine is applied to other industries, emphasizing how the
treatment of different industries is unequal. Part III of this Note will
discuss and analyze a variety of actual and hypothetical state efforts to
promote sustainable agriculture through the lens of the dormant
Commerce Clause, arguing that the doctrine should be interpreted to
allow such policies.
I. SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FEDERALISM
A.

What Is Sustainable Agriculture?

In attempting to realize the goals of sustainable agriculture,19 an
elusive and amorphous term, advocates have pursued a variety of
approaches.20 The commercially popular organic food movement21 has
been particularly successful in providing food to consumers that is
grown without the use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.22 The
19. See supra note 2.
20. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & The Environment: Informational and
Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2011)
(discussing the possibility of “[a]n ‘alternative’ food system [that] would incorporate organic
foods, eco-labeled foods, direct marketing, fair trade, local foods, farmers markets, and buying
clubs” (citation omitted)); see also Margaret Sova McCabe, Reconsidering Federalism and
the Farm: Toward Including Local, State and Regional Voices in America’s Food System, 6 J.
FOOD L. & POL’Y 151, 162 (2010) (“[F]ood ‘movements’ have a powerful influence on food
systems. These grass roots movements are important, but so too are formal efforts to engage
local, state, and regional voices in food system reform.”).
21. U.S. Organic Industry Overview, ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N (2011), available at
http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/2011OrganicIndustrySurvey.pdf; see A. Bryan Endres,
An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with Big Organics and
Other Legal Challenges for the Industry's Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 17, 18
(2007) (“The organics industry has entered its commercial and regulatory adolescence and
now claims the fastest growing market share of food purchases in the United States.”).
22. Pesticides and Food: What “Organically Grown” Means, U.S. EPA, http://www.ep
a.gov/pesticides/food/organics.htm (last updated May 9, 2012); Claire S. Carroll, Comment,
What Does "Organic" Mean Now? Chickens and Wild Fish Are Undermining the Organic
Foods Production Act of 1990 (Evolution of the Legal Definition of "Organic"-Business
Interests Must Be Stopped from Re-Defining "Organic" Contrary to the Purposes of the
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“‘Slow Food’ movement” encourages farming practices that “improv[e]
agricultural efficiency, maintain[] cultural lifelines, and sustain[] the
environment.”23 The Local Food movement shares many of the same
goals, but focuses primarily on sourcing food for communities from
nearby farms24 or from farms that sell directly to consumers.25 In
general, local food is produced on small farms.26 Policies that support
slow food, local food, and small farms have the potential to improve the
impact of agriculture on our environment, health, and safety.27 These
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990), 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 117, 119 (2004)
(“In 1972, Robert Rodale, J.I.’s son, verbalized the definition of ‘organically grown’ that is
now commonly known: ‘Food grown without pesticides; foods grown without artificial
fertilizers.’” (citations omitted)). Unfortunately, large organic farms share traits in common
with industrialized agricultural practices that will be discussed in more detail infra. See
Czarnezki, supra note 20, at 275 (“The organic food market is flourishing, and, as a result, the
modern organic production and distribution system is now dominated by large-scale
‘industrial organic’ or ‘big organic’ producers. ‘The rise of commercial and industrial
conventions is clear in organic distribution and consumption . . . .’” (quoting Laura T.
Raynolds, The Globalization of Organic Agro-Food Networks, 32 WORLD DEV. 725, 738
(2004)).
23. H. David Gold, Legal Strategies to Address the Misrepresentation of Vermont
Maple Syrup, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 93, 95 (2004). Slow Food USA, a nonprofit
organization, describes its mission: “[T]o counter the rise of fast food and fast life, the
disappearance of local food traditions and people's dwindling interest in the food they eat,
where it comes from, how it tastes and how our food choices affect the rest of the world.”
About Us, SLOW FOOD USA, http://www.slowfood.com/international/1/about-us (last visited
May 13, 2014).
24. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers
Facing Producers of “Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 49, 56 (2011) (“From a
practical standpoint, the local foods movement is exactly what it sounds like: a purposeful
effort by consumers to buy food products from farmers and producers in the cities, regions,
and states in which they live.”).
25. STEPHEN MARTINEZ ET AL., LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS, IMPACTS, AND
ISSUES iii (May 2010) (defining local food by “direct-to-consumer arrangements”), available
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/122868/err97_1_.pdf.
26. Id. at 18 (“[S]mall farms accoun[t] for the largest number of farms engaged in direct
sales.”).
27. See Gail Feenstra, Chuck Ingels & David Campbell, What is Sustainable
Agriculture?, AGRIC. SUSTAINABILITY INST. AT UCDAVIS, http://www.sarep.ucdavis.edu/abo
ut-sarep/def (last visited May 14, 2014). “Sustainable agriculture integrates three main
goals—environmental health, economic profitability, and social and economic equity. . . .” Id.
Furthermore, sustainability includes “consideration of social responsibilities such as working
and living conditions of laborers, the needs of rural communities, and consumer health and
safety both in the present and the future.” Id; see also Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and
Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17
GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 611-12 (2010) (“[P]esticides can . . . caus[e] contamination to
drinking water sources, contamination of fish that humans consume, and direct skin contact ...
in contaminated waters . . . . [Also], industrial agriculture can impact human health indirectly,
by influencing the foods people eat.”); see also id. at 602-03 (“[I]ndustrial agriculture has led
to . . . high-risk working and living conditions for farm laborers . . . and a decline of economic
and social conditions in rural communities . . . . A range of industrial agricultural practices
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policies, if implemented on a broad scale, can help to counteract some of
the negative effects that have resulted from the industrialization of
agriculture.
B. Industrial Agriculture and Federal Policy
Over the past seventy years, the federal government has gradually
increased its control over agricultural policy.28 This coincides with, and
has provided support to, the industrialization of agriculture.29 Along
with efficiency in food production, industrialization has brought
negative consequences to the environment, to human health and safety,
and to animal welfare, culminating in its impact on climate change.30
A period of severe drought and wind storms in the 1930s known as
the Dust Bowl led to the implementation of federal programs that were
meant to help farmers avoid destitution while maintaining sufficient
food production.31 Perhaps the most significant piece of legislation to
contribute to environmental harms.”); cf. Johnson & Endres, supra note 24, at 99 (“[T]he
policy justifications supporting the notion of ‘small producer exceptionalism’ are, empirically,
a mixed bag . . . . Given the current state of research, the big challenge for local foods
advocates is to reconcile their best-supported argument (economics) with their least-supported
argument (food safety).”).
28. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 37.
30. David N. Cassuto & Sarah Saville, Hot, Crowded, and Legal: A Look at Industrial
Agriculture in the United States and Brazil, 18 ANIMAL L. 185, 186-87 (2012) (exploring the
negative impact of industrialized agriculture).
31. Surviving the Dust Bowl, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films
/dustbowl/ (last visited May 14, 2014). Policies included the Emergency Banking Act of
1933, the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, the Farm Credit Act of 1933, and the Emergency
Relief Appropriation Act. Congress followed this legislation with the creation of the Soil
Erosion Service in 1933 and implementation of the Soil Erosion Act of 1935. Id.
Additionally, the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, also known as the first Farm Bill, was
meant to stabilize the agricultural industry during the Great Depression. The shift toward
strong federal control over the agriculture industry helped cement the role of the U.S. in the
international agriculture market:
Before the New Deal, politicians considered agriculture the province of the
states. After the New Deal, agriculture became the economic concern of the
federal government, and it has remained so since 1937. Before the Depression,
no federal law existed that imposed a penalty on a farmer who saved crops for
his own or local use rather than selling on the national or international market.
However, the economic downturn and the needs of the national and international
grain market ended the farmer's practice of crop saving to promote market
stability. As a result, the Commerce Clause (including the dormant, or negative,
commerce clause) and the national and international market became paramount
in agricultural policy. Local farms, local markets, and local preferences ceded to
the economic stability of “the unitary national market.” Moreover, that market
served to position the U.S. as a global trading partner.
Margaret Sova McCabe, Foodshed Foundations: Law's Role in Shaping Our Food System's
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come out of this national disaster was the first Farm Bill, known at the
time as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.32 The Act introduced
subsidies into American agricultural policy, providing relief during an
economic and environmental crisis by decreasing market supply and
preventing prices from plummeting.33 The Farm Bill was “wellintentioned at the outset,” but its “subsidy program has gradually
snowballed into a legislative package of subsidized commodities that
increasingly benefits the largest of agricultural producers.”34
In the decades following the first Farm Bill, prices for agricultural
produce continued to decline as industrial efficiency transformed
farming practices by introducing new machinery, hybridized crops,
synthetic pesticides and fertilizers, and animal confinement methods; it
became more difficult for small family farms to be successful.35
Consequently, farmers “respond[ed] by reducing overhead and labor,
and by ensuring markets for their production” and “increasing [the] size
of farm operations.”36 Federal policy continued to evolve, controlling
the market supply of certain crops to keep prices high, and encouraging
the over-production of other crops to keep prices low.37 Federal policy
goals have shifted over the decades, yet through each phase of
development, the viability of large, industrial agribusiness continues to
improve while small farms have all but disappeared from the nation’s
agrarian landscape.38
Future, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 578-79 (2011).
32. See William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental
Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
213, 219 (2009).
[T]he 1933 Farm Bill ambitiously sought to do many things: bring crop prices
back to stability by weaning the nation from its affinity for agricultural
overproduction, utilize surplus crops productively to combat widespread hunger
and provide nutritional assistance to children in the form of school lunch
programs, implement strategies to prevent further erosion and soil loss from poor
land conservation policies and weather events, provide crop insurance and credit
assurances for subsistence farmers, and build community infrastructure for rural
farming towns.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 221.
35. DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y & MINN.
PROJECT, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 7 (2002), available at
http://www.mnproject.org/publications/New%20Agricultural%20Policy%20for%20the%20U
S.pdf.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 8.
38. For a more in-depth discussion of federal farm policy and its effects on the U.S.
agriculture industry, see Eubanks, supra note 32, at 221, and KEENEY & KEMP, supra note 35.

CHRIS ERCHULL

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

378

[Vol. 36:371

Still, the federal policies persist. Despite some efforts at the federal
and state levels to support small farms and sustainable agriculture,39 the
current policy in place reflects the crisis that brought about the New
Deal:
It is often argued that federal U.S. agricultural program benefits are
an anachronism, an unnecessary throwback that today’s farmers
could and should be forced to do without. Yet the programs
stubbornly remain, seemingly defying gravity as they transfer tens of
billions of dollars from taxpayers to relatively wealthy farmers.
....
While U.S. farm policy has changed incrementally over the past
five decades, by many measures recent government involvement in
agriculture is as great as it has ever been. Agricultural policy
persists, despite huge changes in the socioeconomic characteristics
40
of U.S. farmers and farm landowners.

Current federal policy has the effect of favoring industrial
production,41 which works against the success of small farms and stands
as an obstacle to the goals of the sustainable agriculture movement.42
C. Small Farms
Food originating from small farms is more likely to be sustainably
produced than food that comes from large farms, and it is also more
likely to come from a local farm if it is produced on a small farm. 43
Small farms that sell directly to consumers not only offer immediate
access to fresh food, but are also accountable to their communities.44
39. See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo et al., Small, Slow, and Local: Essays on Building a
More Sustainable and Local Food System, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 353, 372 (2011) (“The 2008
Farm Bill established a process by which local farmers selling at farmers' markets may accept
food stamps, thereby making locally grown foods more readily available to food stamp
recipients.”).
40. David Bullock & Jay S. Coggins, Do Farmers Receive Huge Rents for Small
Lobbying Efforts?, in AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 146-47 (Luther G.
Tweeten & Stanley R. Thompson eds., 2002) (citation omitted).
41. See Eubanks, supra note 32, at 218.
42. See infra Part I.C.
43. See Gerard D’Souza & John Ikerd, Small Farms and Sustainable Development: Is
Small More Sustainable?, 28 J. OF AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 73, 82 (Jul. 1996) (“[T]he
characteristics of small farms seem to most closely resemble those of sustainable systems. . . .
[S]mall is more sustainable than large.”), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream
/15243/1/28010073.pdf.
44. See Monika Roth, Overview of Farm Direct Marketing Industry Trends, AGRIC.
OUTLOOK FORUM 1999, at 4 (Feb. 1999), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream
/32905/1/fo99ro01.pdf (“Direct marketing gives farmers the opportunity to respond to
consumer needs, test new products and services, explore niche markets, and measure
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Furthermore, the carbon footprint of food production is smaller when the
food is produced locally and on a small farm.45 But small farms are
disappearing in the United States.46
Federal policy has continued to support industrialized agriculture,
despite decades of research and scholarship dedicated to informing the
government of the imminent disappearance of the family farm from the
landscape of the United States.47 In 1998, the United States Department
of Agriculture’s National Commission on Small Farms produced a
study, A Time to Act, pleading with the federal government to implement
policies to save small family farms from extinction.48 The message was
clear: “If we do not act now, we will no longer have a choice about the
kind of agriculture we desire as a Nation.”49 This study was the second
of a series, which began in 1981 with A Time to Choose,50 but at that
time, “talking about the structure of agriculture [was] politically
incorrect.”51
The Supreme Court once considered the regulation of agriculture an
inherently local power reserved to the states.52 In fact, many aspects of
agriculture are inherently local in nature.53 The size, output, and
consumer response.”).
45. A small farm only has a small carbon footprint if its production methods are
efficient, but small farms are generally efficient. See Miguel A. Altieri, Agroecology, Small
Farms, and Food Sovereignty, 61-03 MONTHLY REV. 102, 105 (2009) (“Although the
conventional wisdom is that small family farms are backward and unproductive, research
shows that small farms are much more productive than large farms if total output is
considered rather than yield from a single crop.”).
46. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
47. See Desmond A. Jolly, Small Farms Re-emerge in National Agenda, 53(6) CAL.
AGRIC. 2, 2 (1999), available at http://ucce.ucdavis.edu/files/repositoryfiles/ca5306p267421.pdf (discussing the origin of the movement to restore to U.S. policy the Jeffersonian
ideal of small farms).
48. USDA NAT’L COMM’N ON SMALL FARMS, A TIME TO ACT 4-5 (1998), available at
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/ag_systems/pdfs/time_to_act_1998.pdf.
49. Id. at 5.
50. USDA NAT’L COMM’N ON SMALL FARMS, A TIME TO CHOOSE (1981).
51. Neil D. Hamilton, Agriculture Without Farmers? Is Industrialization Restructuring
American Food Production and Threatening the Future of Sustainable Agriculture?, 14 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 613, 625 (1994).
52. “[T]he supervision of agriculture . . . [is] proper to be provided for by local
legislation.” McCabe, supra note 20, at 151; see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68
(1936) (invalidating parts of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 because “[i]t is a
statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers
delegated to the federal government”); CHRISTINE A. VARNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: ENHANCING FEDERAL/STATE COOPERATION 6-7 (2009)
(discussing the local nature of agricultural antitrust regulation), available at http://www.justic
e.gov/atr/public/speeches/250635.pdf.
53. See Kenneth E. Barker, The New Federalism: Time for States to Pull the Plow in
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profitability of farms vary dramatically by state.54 The federal
government has taken steps toward reforming its policy to support
sustainable agriculture, but the impact has been very limited, and local
governments are better equipped to enact policies that promote small
farm development within their jurisdictional boundaries.55 Also, groups
of small farmers engaged in lobbying efforts are better positioned to
appeal to state and local governments because access to the federal
government requires greater resources.
D. State-Level Interest in Sustainable Agriculture
Local and state governments are well-suited to enact legislation that
promotes sustainable agriculture by supporting small farmers, despite
the post-Depression role that the federal government has assumed in
regulating the agricultural industry.56
States have an important interest within their police power that
justifies promoting sustainable agriculture, even in states where the
absence of very large farms means that industrialized agriculture does
not cause direct harm.57 The police power interest includes human
Soil Conservation, 30 S.D. L. REV. 546, 551 (1985) (discussing soil conservation as an
inherently local activity that should be regulated by the states), available at
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/note-the-new-federalism-time-for-states-to-pullthe-plow-in-soil-conservation-30-south-dakota-l-rev-546-573-1986/wppa_open/; Marci A.
Hamilton, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, ASS'N OF AM. L. SCHS., http://www.aals.org
/profdev/constitutional/hamilton.html (last visited May 13, 2014) (“Real property is tied to a
particular location, and its use immediately impacts a singular group, the local community.”).
54. See, USDA NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., AVERAGE FARM SIZE BY STATE
(2006) available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Farms_and_Land_in_Farm
s/fncht6.asp. Note that every state in New England has an average farm size of less than 200
acres, less than half the national average. Id; see also Agricultural Productivity in the U.S.,
USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY IN THE U.S. available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-us.aspx#28250. Six of
the eight states with the lowest agricultural output in 2004 are New England states. Id. at
table 20.
55. See McCabe, supra note 20, at 152 (“[U]nless reforms to the food system include
local, state, and regional contributions and control, chances at curbing food-related diseases,
improving poor nutrition, and reconnecting with the natural environment will diminish.”). But
see USDA, ASSISTING AMERICA’S SMALL FARMERS AND RANCHERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(2003) (reporting on progress made by the USDA toward policies that support small
agricultural operations), available at http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/ag_systems/pdfs/
meeting_challenge_time_to_act.pdf.
56. “[T]he supervision of agriculture . . . [is] proper to be provided for by local
legislation . . . . ” McCabe, supra note 20, at 151 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 17
(Alexander Hamilton)). “New Deal federalism and its progeny created distance between
Americans and their food, contributing to the sense that Americans do not shape the food
system, but allow it to shape us.” McCabe, supra note 20, at 152.
57. Every state has constitutional authority to legislate to promote the health, safety,
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health as exemplified by the American obesity epidemic, environmental
conservation related to the preservation of farmland, regional food
security, and the traceability of contaminated food outbreaks.58
1. Access to Fresh Food and the Obesity Epidemic
Lack of access to fresh food has contributed to problems related
to poor health in this country.59 Among the scientific community,
research suggests that “[t]here is a growing understanding that the
availability of residential neighborhood resources that support . . .
healthy food choices may influence obesity rates.”60
As the USDA notes, there is unquestionably “a correlation
between food accessibility and BMI and obesity,” but other factors also
contribute to health problems among Americans.61 Therefore, ideally,
state and local governments will address obesity and diet-related health
problems with comprehensive planning. However, that planning should
include improving access to fresh food as a critical component.62
2. Farmland Preservation and the Environment
Farmland across the country has been disappearing rapidly, at a rate
faster than an acre per minute.63 According to American Farmland
and environment of its citizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
58. See generally McCabe, supra note 31, at 574-81 (discussing the inherent power of
states to regulate food production).
59. In one particular study on the correlation between health and access to grocery
stores, “[t]he presence of supermarkets was associated with a lower prevalence of overweight,
obesity, and hypertension.” Kimberly Morland et al., Supermarkets, Other Food Stores, and
Obesity: The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 333,
335 (2006), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/57754/
Supermarkets%20other%20food%20stores%20and%20obesity.pdf;jsessionid=A14333BFF2B
A47B51D7A1D868CED9C3E?sequence=1.
60. Andrew Rundle et al., Neighborhood Food Environment and Walkability Predict
Obesity in New York City, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 442, 442 (2008), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2661915/#b35-ehp-117-442.
61. USDA, FOOD ACCESS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO DIET AND HEALTH OUTCOMES,
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE AND NUTRITIOUS FOOD: MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING FOOD
DESERTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 51, 56 (2009), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/m
edia/242606/ap036d_1_.pdf.
62. Former Mayor of Boston, Thomas Menino, has voiced support for programs that
improve access for children to fresh food: “[w]hen I go to work in the morning, I see kids
standing at the bus stop eating chips and drinking a soda. . . . I hope this will help them change
their eating habits and lead to a healthier lifestyle.” Natasha Singer, Eat an Apple (Doctor’s
Orders), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at B1 (covering a pilot program in Massachusetts where
health professionals “prescribe” fruits and vegetables to children with diet-related health
problems), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/business/13veggies.html?_r=0.
63. Farmland Protection, AM. FARMLAND TR., http://www.farmland.org
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Trust, this poses an environmental threat to the affected areas:
Well-managed agricultural land supplies important non-market
goods and services for our environment. Farm and ranch lands
provide food and cover for wildlife, help control flooding, protect
wetlands and watersheds and maintain air quality. They can absorb
and filter wastewater and provide groundwater recharge. New energy
crops even have the potential to replace fossil fuels. 64

This puts farmland preservation squarely within the police power of
state and local governments.
3. Regional Food Security
“Food security,” according to the federal government, “is achieved
when all people at all times have physical and economic access to
sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy
life.”65 This includes maintaining access to food even in the wake of
crises like earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. 66 State and
local governments have a great interest in ensuring access to food,
especially considering the great distance food has to travel when local
food systems are not available to provide resources in an emergency.67
4. Outbreaks
Common sense indicates that it is easier to trace outbreaks when the
food is produced, distributed, and consumed locally. A large producer
may distribute vegetables from a contaminated crop across a wide
geographic area, and when it becomes clear that the produce is
contaminated, it will be difficult to trace the contamination back to the
original source.68 It is also difficult to identify the final destination of
/programs/protection/default.asp (last visited May 13, 2014) (“Every minute of every day, we
have been losing more than an acre of agricultural land to development.”).
64. Id; see also Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland Preservation, 3 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 237 (1998) (analyzing the issue of farmland preservation as a global concern).
65. U.S. ACTION PLAN ON FOOD SECURITY, A MILLENNIUM FREE FROM HUNGER 2
(2000).
66. A. Bryan Endres & Jody M. Endres, Homeland Security Planning: What Victory
Gardens and Fidel Castro Can Teach Us in Preparing for Food Crises in the United States,
64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 405 (2009) (explaining that food security requires “maintain[ing]
sufficient food supplies in a time of crisis, in addition to an individual's basic right to daily,
adequate nutrition”).
67. See id. at 407 (“The federal government has not considered the role of regional and
local food networks in its national homeland security planning.”).
68. Note that the question of whether local foods are safer “has not been fully addressed
by scientific literature.” See Johnson & Endres, supra note 24, at 91-96, and sources cited
therein.
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every item that originated from the contaminated crop.69 When
contaminated food is grown, sold, and eaten within one community,
identifying the source of the contamination is a much simpler task.70
The ability to trace the outbreak of foodborne illnesses is undoubtedly a
legitimate health and safety concern for a state government.71
State governments are well-equipped to promote the sustainable
production of food.72 States are highly motivated to foster locally
produced foods because it benefits the local economy in addition to
bolstering regional food security and preserving farmland within the
state.73 These benefits come at the risk of increased isolationism among
the states, an economic tendency that courts have historically struggled
to temper by way of the dormant Commerce Clause.74
II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Courts recognize an implied negative aspect to the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution,75 and under this doctrine, states are
prohibited from enacting legislation that interferes with interstate
commerce.76 Because the federal government has taken a prominent role
69. Id.
70. The FDA has suggested there is no evidence of elevated risk arising from smallscale egg regulation. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production,
Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33030, 33036 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 16, 118). For more commentary on this issue:
Imagine if a large industrial food conglomerate sold Salmonella-tainted spinach
to 100 local restaurants. Because the conglomerate dealt directly with the
restaurants instead of a network of distributors and wholesalers, the source of the
Salmonella outbreak would be immediately identifiable. This is essentially the
“built-in” safety advantage of local food.
Peter Anderson, Comment, Empowering Local and Sustainable Food: Does the Food Safety
Modernization Act's Tester-Hagan Amendment Remove Enough Barriers?, 9 J.L. ECON. &
POL'Y 145, 167 (2012).
71. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28-29 (1905) (holding
that a state may require vaccinations in exercise of its police power to protect public health by
preventing the spread of disease).
72. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.1 and cases cited therein.
73. For a discussion of state agricultural legislation benefitting the local economy, see
Megan Galey & A. Bryan Endres, Locating the Boundaries of Sustainable Agriculture, 17
NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL'Y 3, 25-27 (2012).
74. See infra Part II. A primary justification for the dormant Commerce Clause offered
by the Supreme Court is “to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization . . . among
the States.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
76. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-91 (1824) (defining commerce as
“commercial intercourse . . . regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse”
and reserving that power exclusively to Congress, thereby preempting legislation by states that
attempt concurrent regulation). Notably, in his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall exempted state
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in the regulation of the agriculture industry,77 state laws in this industry
are especially vulnerable to challenge under the dormant Commerce
Clause.78
Critics say that courts apply the dormant Commerce Clause with
unpredictable results.79 The unpredictable application of the dormant
Commerce Clause has a chilling effect on potentially revolutionary state
legislation.80 The Constitution has long been interpreted to impose
restrictions on what states can do to promote local agriculture.81 But the
standards used by courts in deciding cases in the context of some
industries not related to the production of food are arguably more
laws that “are, in their nature, health laws.” Id. at 20.
77. See supra Part I.B.
78. See infra Part III.
79. Justice Stevens criticized the application of the dormant Commerce Clause by
noting that “our law in this area is something of a ‘quagmire’ and the ‘application of
constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much room for controversy and
confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their
indispensable power of taxation.’” Quill Corp. v. N.D. By & Through Heitkamp, 504 U.S.
298, 315-16 (1992) (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minn., 358 U.S. 450, 457
(1959)). A federal court in Vermont opined that “it is probably an understatement to say that
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to limits on
state taxation powers, is unpredictable.” Barringer v. Griffes, 801 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (D. Vt.
1992) rev'd, 1 F.3d 1331 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Lincoln L. Davies, Note, If You Give the
Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate
Waste Jurisprudence, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 252-53 (1999) (“[I]t is impossible to
draw from [the application of the dormant Commerce Clause] any coherent and consistent
theoretical framework. Indeed, modern constitutional law texts all seem to have their own
take on the issue, analyzing the doctrine in their own, rather different ways. The doctrine is
also unpredictable.”).
80. According to an astute analysis:
“Results in Dormant Commerce Clause cases are notoriously unpredictable,” and
this lack of predictability unnecessarily complicates national economic policy.
The effect of the confusion is to chill state innovation, encourage lengthy
litigation, and require Congress to intervene to remedy improvident judicial
decisions. A clear policy that allows the states to regulate in the absence of
congressional action would be preferable.
Sherry Young, Is "Due Process" Unconstitutional? The NCAA Wins Round One in its Fight
Against Regulation of its Enforcement Proceedings, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 841, 866 (1993)
(quoting Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENTARY 395, 399 (1986)); see also Julian Cyril Zebot, Note, Awakening a Sleeping
Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2002) (“To the extent that the courts'
indiscriminate approach in finding discriminatory purpose increases the potential for
unwarranted and unpredictable judicial interference, it chills state and local creativity in
crafting environmentally friendly waste management policies and undermines the dormant
Commerce Clause as a doctrine.”); see generally Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J.
569 (1987) (criticizing the lack of rigor applied to dormant Commerce Clause challenges).
81. See infra Part II.A.
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relaxed from the doctrine as applied to agriculture.82
A. Application of Dormant Commerce Clause to Agriculture
1. Agriculture in the Supreme Court
Since Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that the federal government has primary regulatory authority over the
agriculture industry.83 A series of Supreme Court cases thwarted
attempts by states to favor local agricultural production, processing, and
distribution, relying on the dormant Commerce Clause.84 In particular,
the Court’s decisions in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias and West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy come the nearest to addressing the issue of
whether it is constitutional for a state to favor local foods.85
At issue in Bacchus was a tax applied to all sales of alcohol in
Hawai'i,86 with the exceptions of an alcoholic beverage made from a root
native to Hawai'i, known as 'okolehao, in addition to pineapple wine and
other non-grape fruit wine.87 The tax was primarily intended to benefit
the burgeoning pineapple wine industry in Hawai'i.88 The Court flatly
dismissed the state’s argument that the 'okolehao and pineapple wine
82. See infra Part II.B.
83. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress has authority under
the Commerce Clause to limit the amount of wheat grown for personal use on private
farmland).
84. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (invalidating laws that favor instate wine producers); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (invalidating an
act that applied a tax to all companies selling milk in Massachusetts, but distributed the
benefits of the tax exclusively to in-state dairy farmers); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating a Hawaiian law that favored production of alcoholic beverages
made from native plants); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(invalidating a North Carolina rule that required disadvantaged, out-of-state apple producers
to use a strict safety inspection standard); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S.
349 (1951) (invalidating a Madison ordinance that required all milk sold in the city to have
been pasteurized at a plant within a five mile radius of the city). In each of these cases, the
Court conducts a careful dormant Commerce Clause analysis before reaching a conclusion,
and none of these opinions forecloses the possibility that states may regulate agriculture in
such a way that does not discriminate impermissibly against interstate commerce.
85. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
86. In Hawai'i, the preferred spelling of the name of the state includes a form of
punctuation known as an 'okina, which closely resembles an apostrophe. In an effort to be
sensitive to the people of Hawai'i, I have chosen to follow this convention. See A Handbook
of Citation Form for Law Clerks at the Appellate Courts of the State of Hawai'i, Hawai'i State
Judiciary, at 23 (2008) (“The Hawai'i Judiciary has adopted a policy that encourages spelling
and punctuating Hawaiian words correctly, i.e., using the 'okina . . . .”).
87. Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 265.
88. Id.
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industries were separate and distinct from the industry of other alcoholic
beverages, and that there was no direct competition among the
industries.89 While the tax exemption did not discriminate against outof-state interests on its face, the Court found discriminatory intent and
effect.90 By determining that the markets were the same and the tax
discriminatory, the Court made it clear that states attempting to favor
local agricultural production through discriminatory taxes, at least in the
production of alcoholic beverages, would be susceptible to constitutional
challenges.91 This threat looms over the sustainable agriculture
movement today.
The Court reached a similar holding in West Lynn Creamery, where
a Massachusetts pricing order required the collection of an assessment
on all milk sales.92 The proceeds were then distributed only to in-state
dairy farmers.93 The assessment at issue did not facially discriminate
against out-of-state interests because it applied equally to all dairy
retailers.94 However, the fact that all of the proceeds were distributed to
local dairy farmers95 resulted in a discriminatory impact.96 The Court
reasoned that the assessment “not only assists local farmers, but burdens
interstate commerce. The pricing order thus violates the cardinal
principle that a State may not ‘benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors.’”97 By invalidating legislation based
on the benefits provided to local agricultural enterprises, the decision in
West Lynn casts a foreboding shadow over prospective legislation that
might seek to advance the Local Food movement.
2. Anti-Corporate Farming Initiatives
Laws that limit the corporate ownership of farmland have been
enacted in at least fourteen states.98 Some of the explanations that are
offered in support of anti-corporate farming initiatives include
89. Id. at 268-69.
90. Id. at 271.
91. Id.
92. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 186.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 191-92.
95. Id. at 191.
96. Id. at 194.
97. Id. at 199 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 27374 (1988)).
98. Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl, South Dakota Amendment E Ruled
Unconstitutional—Is There a Future for Legislative Involvement in Shaping the Structure of
Agriculture?, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 285, 285 n.5 (2004) (listing laws in each of fourteen
states).
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circumventing the limited liability of corporations, controlling the
economic structure of food production and distribution, the lack of
investment in local interests by out-of-state corporations, opening land
for use by new farmers, and the negative socioeconomic impact of
agribusiness on rural communities.99
A landmark 2003 case struck down an amendment to the South
Dakota State Constitution outlawing corporate ownership of in-state
farmland.100 The Eighth Circuit decision in South Dakota Farm Bureau,
Inc. v. Hazeltine “is viewed as critical to the future viability of anticorporate farming restrictions in other states and, more generally, to the
ability of state legislatures to shape the structure of agriculture within
their borders.”101 The opinion signaled the death of a constitutional
amendment that was supported by a majority of voters in South Dakota
in 1998.102
The decision rested on the finding of a discriminatory purpose in
the constitutional amendment.103 This impermissible purpose was
determined based on the court’s analysis of the drafting process.104 The
court also criticized the lack of supporting evidence for the claim that the
amendment would be beneficial to the environment.105
The
discriminatory intent made the amendment virtually per se invalid in the
eyes of the court.106 Since less discriminatory methods of achieving the
same goals were plausible, such as rigorous enforcement of enhanced
environmental regulations,107 the amendment was stricken.108
A few years later, the Eighth Circuit echoed the dormant
99. Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate-Farming Measures in a Post-Jones World, 14
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97, 99-102 (2009).
100. South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003), aff’g
202 F.Supp. 2d 1020 (D. S.D. 2002).
101. McEowen & Harl, supra note 98, at 285 (citation omitted).
102. McEowen & Harl, supra note 98, at 288 (citation omitted).
103. South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc., 340 F.3d at 594.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 595 (“[T]he less information concerning the potential impact of [the
amendment] that the drafters had, the less likely that [it] would actually be an effective
remedy for the problems it was purportedly designed to address. A low probability of
effectiveness can be indirect evidence of discriminatory purpose.”). The court also
acknowledged that the intent of the voters who supported the amendment was unknowable,
but concluded that this was not an important fact. Id. at 596 (“We . . . have evidence of the
intent of individuals who drafted the amendment that went before the voters. It is clear that
those individuals had a discriminatory purpose.”).
106. Id. at 597.
107. Id. (“[T]he State could introduce stricter environmental regulations or could more
aggressively enforce its current environmental laws.”).
108. Id. at 598.
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Commerce Clause analysis in Hazeltine in response to a challenge to a
1985 anti-corporate farming amendment to the Nebraska State
Constitution.109
Once again, the court easily identified the
discriminatory intent of the drafters of the amendment.110 The court
determined that, just as in South Dakota, the legislators in Nebraska had
less discriminatory alternatives for reaching the environmental goals
supported by the amendment, like improved “land use and
environmental regulations.”111
The amendment was held
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.112
While no other courts have addressed anti-corporate farming
initiatives, the Eighth Circuit holdings (in addition to the other dormant
Commerce Clause cases discussed above) provide a basis for
determining whether legislation that promotes sustainable farming113
would survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. They may also
potentially impact whether similar legislation may be enacted in other
states.114 The following section of this Note will argue that careful
framing of prospective legislative initiatives will result in legislation that
can survive dormant Commerce Clause challenges, but only where steps
are taken to position the initiatives in a nondiscriminatory manner that
does not interfere with interstate commerce. Generally, courts approach
evaluation under the dormant Commerce Clause based on the specific
nature of the challenged legislation,115 which provides some context for
exploring how local governments may encourage sustainable agriculture
109. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 2006).
110. In fact, the intent was clearer in Nebraska than in Iowa. Jones, 470 F.3d at 1270
(“[T]elevision advertisements that supporters of Initiative 300 produced before its adoption
concluded by stating: ‘Let's send a message to those rich out-of-state corporations. Our land's
not for sale, and neither is our vote. Vote for Initiative 300.’ It is clear beyond cavil that these
ads bristle with an animus against out-of-state corporations.”).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1271 (“We . . . have no other option than to . . . hold that the entire
amendment . . . is unconstitutional.”).
113. Note that policies that support the consumption of sustainably produced food are
distinct from the goals of anti-corporate farming laws, which intend to “restrict corporations
from owning agricultural land.” Schutz, supra note 99, at 98.
114. See Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 18
URB. LAW. 567, 587 (1986) (“Because the outcomes of the cases are so unpredictable, the
doctrine may well have a chilling effect on legitimate state regulation.”), available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1307&context=facpubs; see
also McEowen & Harl, supra note 98, at 302 (“The opinion [in Hazeltine] could also have a
chilling effect on further legislation impacting the future structure of agriculture.”).
115. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Law Professors in Support of
Petitioners at 5, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51 (2012) (No. 10-1322) (“The Court's
precedent eschews rigid, formalistic rules, and instead requires a textured and fact-specific
inquiry into the purpose and effect of the state legislation.”).
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while withstanding constitutional scrutiny.
3. Inconsistent Lower Court Decisions
The decision in Granholm v. Heald stated unequivocally that
Amendment XXI, which repealed Prohibition116 while leaving states
wide latitude in regulating alcoholic beverages,117 does not guarantee
local governments the right to enact discriminatory laws that favor the
local alcoholic beverage industry.118 Since Granholm, several attempts
have been made to circumvent dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
through legislation that does not facially discriminate against out-of-state
interests.119
Two circuit court opinions have examined whether a statute can
be in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause by way of facial
discrimination against larger producers of wine in favor of smaller
producers; the First Circuit struck down a Massachusetts statute120 and
the Ninth Circuit upheld an Arizona statute.121 The statutes were very
similar, having both been passed in the wake of Granholm v. Heald, and
both trying to accomplish the same kind of regulation that Granholm v.
Heald found unconstitutional.122
Both statutes allowed some
winemakers to sell directly to consumers and retailers, thus bypassing
the requirement to sell only to wholesalers.123 That advantage was only
available to small producers, forcing large producers to continue to sell
only to wholesalers.124 In Massachusetts, there were no in-state
producers of wine that exceeded the production limit, known as the
gallonage cap.125 In Arizona, there was exactly one producer in the state
that met the threshold.126 Both statutes were challenged based on the

116. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
117. Id. at § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”).
118. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 461 (2005).
119. Kevin C. Quigley, Note, Uncorking Granholm: Extending the Nondiscrimination
Principle to All Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871, 1888 (2011).
120. See Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
121. See Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010).
122. Quigley, supra note 119, at 1888 (“Some states, for example, revised their direct
shipping laws so that they discriminated in incidental effect . . . . In the resulting litigation,
federal courts have been unable to reach a consistent interpretation of the Granholm
mandate.”) (citations omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 4.
126. Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010).
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effects they would have on the wine market: consumers would purchase
more wine from small wineries, and since small wineries are, as a
practical matter, more likely to be successful locally, the statutes altered
the balance between in-state and out-of-state wine purchasing, thus
impermissibly interfering with interstate commerce.127
There is an explanation in Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver for
why the two courts reached different conclusions about the
constitutionality of the respective statutes: “[T]he plaintiffs in that case,
unlike the plaintiffs here, had evidence to prove their contentions.”128
The First Circuit opinion did not discuss the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs showing the discriminatory effects of the statute. The court did
refer to the Arizona district court case upheld in Black Star Farms LLC
v. Oliver, distinguishing it only by saying: “[W]e [do not] find the
reasoning . . . to be persuasive.”129
The two circuit court cases involve actions of state legislators that
seem to have obvious protectionist purposes. The statutes in place at the
time of Granholm v. Heald in both states were no longer valid, and so
both states enacted these statutes presumably with the intent to serve the
same local protectionist needs. Generally, when the motivations of
legislation are challenged in court, “[i]nterests are found to be
illegitimate only when the state, in the Court’s words, ‘artlessly
discloses’ the aim of favoring its own people economically.” 130 If the
different outcomes in these two circuit court cases are due to “artless
disclosure” or a test of “whether the legislature has a stupid staff,”131
then the credibility of the dormant Commerce Clause as a rigorous
doctrine is further undermined.132 Alternatively, it may be more
appropriate to attribute the disparate outcomes to different
understandings of the doctrines in the two circuits.
127. Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 10; Black Star Farms LLC, 600 F.3d at 1231.
128. Black Star Farms LLC, 600 F.3d at 1233. While helpful, this analysis raises more
questions than answers. For example, how prudent is a constitutional doctrine that would
reach opposite conclusions regarding state laws in similar cases based solely on how the
attorneys present the cases?
129. Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 13 n.14.
130. Smith, supra note 13, at 1235 (citing Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349, 354 (1951)). Note that the content of the statute and the true intentions of legislators are
only part of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis; because the record of a case may
incidentally bear on the outcome, it may result in disparate outcomes.
131. See Gregory S. Weber, Forging A More Coherent Groundwater Policy in
California: State and Federal Constitutional Law Challenges to Local Groundwater Export
Restrictions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 479 (1994) (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012 n.12 (1992)) (drawing attention to the unreliability of a
test based on statements by legislatures).
132. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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The First Circuit’s invalidation of the Massachusetts statute in
Family Winemakers was foreshadowed by an earlier case involving
discrimination that effectively favored small businesses in Puerto
Rico.133 In Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, the First Circuit decided whether a
grandfather clause that allowed pharmacies in operation in Puerto Rico
in 1979 to open new stores without first seeking a specific permit.134
This clause was held unconstitutional by the First Circuit because the
vast majority of pharmacies existing in Puerto Rico at the time (92%)
were locally owned and operated.135 When considered with Family
Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, this case demonstrates a level of
consistency in the reasoning of the First Circuit.
Conversely, another interesting case out of Puerto Rico, Coors
Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, demonstrates the inconsistent
application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.136 The district court
opinion was overturned on grounds unrelated to the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis because a federal comity decision made it procedurally
invalid for the statute to be challenged in federal court without
exhausting state court remedies.137 The legislative act at issue in this
case was a tax that applied only to large producers of beer.138 The
district court dismissed the claim of discriminatory intent brought by the
challenger, reasoning: “What motivates one legislator to make a speech
about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact
it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”139
The district court further reasoned that the statute did not discriminate in
effect because “[b]rewers from other states may also qualify as small
brewers and, indeed, have, during the relevant period.”140 The First
Circuit never had the opportunity to apply the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine in Coors, but the decisions in Family Winemakers of
California and Walgreens imply that this tax would have been
invalidated.141 Outside the First Circuit, however, some industries have
typically received much more relaxed treatment under the dormant
133. Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005).
134. Id. at 53.
135. Id. at 52-53.
136. 787 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.P.R. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 678 F.3d 15 (1st
Cir. 2012).
137. Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 678 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2012).
138. Coors Brewing Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d at 157, aff’d in part, vacated in part, 678 F.3d
15 (1st Cir. 2012).
139. Id. at 171 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)).
140. Id. at 172.
141. Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
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Commerce Clause.142
B. Lenient Application of Dormant Commerce Clause to Other
Industries
1. Dissimilar Business Entities
Some other industries outside the realm of agriculture have
historically been treated more leniently under the dormant Commerce
Clause. The distribution of oil falls into this category. A separate
outcome of Supreme Court analysis indicates that when a state act
discriminates against one type of business in favor of a differently
situated business, it is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce
Clause, despite the fact that the challenged legislation in each case
favors a type of business with local ties.143 For example, the statute at
issue in Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland was enacted in
response to problems that arose from the U.S. petroleum shortage crisis
of 1973.144 During the crisis, gasoline was not fairly distributed among
retailers in Maryland because producers favored company-owned retail
stations to the detriment of independent retail stations.145 In response,
Maryland enacted a law forbidding gasoline producers and refiners from
operating stations within the state.146 The law discriminated against oil
producers and refiners, all of which were outside the state of Maryland,
and the benefits of the statute fell to independent station operators.147
The Court points out that “there are several major interstate marketers of
petroleum that own and operate their own retail gasoline stations” in
Maryland.148 The Court also refers to the fact that since all gasoline sold
in Maryland originated outside the state, the flow of gasoline into the
state is not affected by the statute.149
Similar reasoning was echoed in 1989 when the Court decided
142. See infra Part II.B.
143. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (upholding an Ohio tax
exemption only for natural gas sales by companies that are subject to state regulations);
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep’t of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66 (1989)
(upholding legislation that discriminates against companies that both filed taxes in New Jersey
and paid a federal windfall tax for oil profits); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117
(1978) (upholding a Maryland law that prohibits producers and refiners of oil and gasoline
from selling gasoline directly to consumers).
144. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 121.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 119.
147. Id. at 125.
148. Id. at 125-26.
149. Id. at 125.
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Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, New Jersey
Department of Treasury.150 This case assessed the validity of a New
Jersey tax law that forced oil producers to pay taxes on income related to
federal windfall profits, even though no in-state corporations or
individuals were subject to the tax.151 The tax was upheld by the Court
in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun,152 the sole signer to a dissent
in Exxon eleven years prior.153
The line of cases where the Court invalidated agricultural
legislation can be distinguished from the oil distribution line of cases,
where each act was upheld, based on the way the Court characterized the
industry impacted by state regulation.154 In each case in the oil
distribution line, the Court determined that in-state and out-of-state
entities that were similarly situated were treated even-handedly,
separately viewing the entities burdened by the legislation as dissimilar
and not in direct competition with the favored entities.155 In the
agricultural line, however, the Court determined that burdened entities
were in the same competitive industry as the favored entities.156 To put
the contrast into sharp relief: according to Exxon, oil refiners and
independent oil distributors were dissimilar and not in direct
competition;157 but in Bacchus, pineapple wine producers were similarly
situated to all other producers of alcoholic beverages and were
competing for the same market.158
1. Cable and Satellite
In recent years, state tax legislation that benefits cable companies at
150. 490 U.S. 66 (1989).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 134-35.
154. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997) (“[T]here is a threshold
question whether the companies are indeed similarly situated for constitutional purposes.”).
155. Id.
156. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984) (“Surely one way that
the tax exemption might [foster local industries by encouraging increased consumption] is that
drinkers of other alcoholic beverages might give up or consume less of their customary drinks
in favor of the exempted products because of the price differential that the exemption will
permit.”).
157. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126 (“The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on
some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against
interstate commerce.”); see also Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 310 (“[T]he enterprises
should not be considered ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of a claim of facial discrimination
under the Commerce Clause.”).
158. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 269 (“[W]e are unwilling to conclude that no competition
exists between the exempted and the nonexempted liquors.”).
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the expense of satellite subscribers has been challenged in several cases
under the dormant Commerce Clause.159 Cable companies invest in
local labor and infrastructure in any state where they operate, whereas
satellite companies do not depend on local infrastructure and hire
relatively few local employees for their operations.160 States receive an
obvious benefit from incentivizing investment in local infrastructure.
The local benefits are primarily economic, distinguishing the issue from
agriculture, where the benefits of local production are much more
widespread.161
Satellite companies argue that the unequal taxation schemes are
discriminatory and should therefore be stricken under the dormant
Commerce Clause.162 The states that defend these statutes argue that
there is no discrimination because cable and satellite companies are not
similarly situated, and therefore differential treatment is not
discriminatory.163 State courts in Ohio and North Carolina upheld the
contentious tax schemes;164 however, a strongly worded dissent in the
case out of Ohio suggests that the issue may not be resolved to the
satisfaction of all courts and may come up again in the future.165
The Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari on whether states
may institute tax legislation that favors cable television providers.166
The challenger’s petition insisted that the Court must address the
doctrinal uncertainty that exists in contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, emphasizing the dissonant outcomes of Family
Winemakers of California in the First Circuit and Black Star Farms LLC

159. Douglas R. Cole & Charles M. Steines, State Supreme Court Rejects Commerce
Clause Challenge to Sales Tax Statute; a Dissent Strongly Differs, 21-7 J. MULTISTATE
TAX’N & INCENTIVES 25, 25 (2011).
160. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2007).
161. See supra note 27 and sources cited therein.
162. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ohio 2010), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 51 (2012).
163. Id. at 1193-94 (“[D]ifferential tax treatment of ‘two categories of companies
result[ing] solely from differences between the nature of their businesses, [and] not from the
location of their activities,’ does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.”) (quoting
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep’t. of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 78
(1989)).
164. Id. at 1197; DIRECTV, Inc. v. State, 632 S.E.2d 543, 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
165. See DIRECTV, Inc., 941 N.E.2d at 1202 (Brown, C.J., dissenting) (“In sum, the
sales tax treats competing industries differently, effectively (and perhaps intentionally)
favoring the industry with extensive local ties over the one with comparatively few. Such a
law violates the Commerce Clause. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”).
166. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51 (2012).
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in the Ninth Circuit.167 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would
view cable and satellite companies as similarly situated entities, and it is
also unclear whether small and large farms would be examined under the
same lens. This uncertainty leaves room for crafting legislation that may
survive dormant Commerce Clause review, even where a court may
otherwise find it discriminatory.
III. POTENTIAL FOR STATES TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE
AGRICULTURE168
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, as discussed in the
preceding section, may be employed to challenge any state action that
benefits producers of local foods.169 State actions may survive
constitutional challenge if care is taken to craft legislation that does not
offend contemporary dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Several
options that states may take to survive review are considered below.
A.

Double Food Stamps at Farmers’ Markets

Wholesome Wave began its Double Value Coupon Program in
2008.170
The nonprofit organization initiated the program in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and California with the goal of providing
incentives for low-income families to purchase fresh food directly from
producers at farmers’ markets.171 The program works by securing
donations that double the value of federal benefits such as the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Supplemental
Special Nutrition for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).172 The
167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27-28, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51
(2012) (No. 10-1322), 2012 WL 1594681, at *27-28. (“[T]here is no way to reconcile these
two lines of cases. They represent fundamentally different — indeed opposite — views of the
Commerce Clause, where the outcome depends not on the facts of the case, but on the state
that passes the statute.”). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Law Professors in
Support of Petitioners at 5, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 51 (2012) (No. 10-1322),
2012 WL 2135015, at *5 (“The amici have no direct stake in this litigation, but do have an
interest in seeing Commerce Clause jurisprudence develop in a sound manner. Failure to
correct the decision below could threaten that development. The amici agree with the
petitioners’ description of the splits to which the decision below contributes.”).
168. This Note does not attempt to explore all potential methods states may employ to
promote sustainable agriculture. A variety of alternatives exist, from innocuous advertising
programs that encourage consumers to shop at farmers’ markets to an outright ban on the sale
of goods produced in other states.
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. Double Value Coupon Program (DVCP), WHOLESOME WAVE, http://wholesomew
ave.org/dvcp/ (last visited May 13, 2014).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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success of this program has allowed it to expand, and now there are
beneficiaries in at least twenty-four states who are able to purchase fresh
produce directly from farmers, improving the health of low-income
families and providing support to farmers who make their food available
to these families.173 The reliance on donor funding, however, places
limits on how broadly the program can be implemented.174
States have a powerful interest in lending financial support to
programs like the Double Value Coupon Program, which encourages
better nutrition among low-income residents.175 Because of the strong
correlation between the obesity epidemic and socioeconomic status,176
entitlement benefits may be employed to improve the health of state
citizens. There is an added incentive for farmers’ markets to be made
accessible to low-income families, which may be a step toward solving
the problem of food deserts.177 Furthermore, the Double Value Coupon
Program promotes other important state interests, like the preservation of
farmland and the economic viability of local food production, 178 by
providing financial benefits to local farmers who sell their goods at
farmers’ markets.179
If a state were to fund a similar program, a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge may have traction because the benefits would fall to
local interests at the expense of out-of-state food producers. For
example, a small farm in Massachusetts can benefit from increased sales
at a local farmers’ market due to the availability of entitlements from the
state, while a large vegetable producer in California would not have
equal access to those benefits. In fact, interstate commerce will be
burdened by a market shift toward local purchases.180
173. Id.
174. Deborah Geering, SNAP Challenge: Live on ‘Food Stamps’ for a Week,
ATLANTAMAGAZINE.COM (Oct. 23, 2013) (“The nonprofit organization uses private
donations to double the value of SNAP benefits.”), available at http://www.atlantamagazine
.com/covereddish/2013/10/23/snap-challenge-live-on-food-stamps-for-a-week/print.
175. See Double Value Coupon Program, supra note 170.
176. See supra Part I.D.1.
177. See Vicki A. McCracken et al., Do Farmers’ Markets Ameliorate Food Deserts?,
29 FOCUS 21, 24 (2012) (“There is evidence that farmers’ markets in both rural and urban
areas help to alleviate food deserts; however, rural markets are more likely to be disconnected
from Farmers’ Market Nutrition Programs [in Washington State].”), available at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc291f.pdf. “Several studies . . . have used
the term ‘food deserts’ to describe geographic areas where nutritious and affordable food is
difficult to obtain.” Id.
178. See supra Part I.D.2.
179. See Double Value Coupon Program, supra note 170.
180. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984) (explaining that
providing a benefit to a select category of producers is equivalent to encouraging consumers

CHRIS ERCHULL

2014]

A CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER

397

There is no precedent for dormant Commerce Clause challenges to
succeed against entitlement benefits meant to provide support for lowincome families. On this basis alone, it is likely that a program that
doubles food stamp benefits will not be challenged under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
States are generally not restricted by the
Constitution in how public assistance in the form of social welfare may
be distributed to state citizens.181
It is important that, in implementing a program such as this, states
avoid facial discrimination against out-of-state interests. As asserted by
the Fifth Circuit in 1980, out-of-state producers must be permitted to sell
at in-state farmers’ markets and have access to the state-sponsored
benefits, because otherwise there would be discrimination against outof-state interests.182 If out-of-state farmers are permitted to sell produce
at farmers’ markets in the state, then doubling the value of food stamps
at these markets with state funds should not be vulnerable to
constitutional challenges under the dormant Commerce Clause.
B.

Direct Subsidies for Local Farmers

States may choose to provide direct subsidies to local farmers as a
way to promote sustainable practices and to encourage the preservation
of farmland. This is a method by which states may offset the harmful
effects of federal subsidies.183 Some states already make grants
available for agricultural businesses.184 For example, Vermont recently
passed legislation to implement the Working Lands Enterprise

to “consume less of” products outside that category).
181. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 603-04
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our cases have always recognized the legitimacy of limiting
state-provided welfare benefits to bona fide residents.”).
182. See Smith v. Dep’t. of Agric. of Ga., 630 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that it is a per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause to restrict participation in a statesponsored farmers’ market to in-state producers).
183. According to William S. Eubanks II, federal subsidies have been a cause of great
harm to food production in the United States:
The decisions made by those in power have resulted in the gradual narrowing of
commodity subsidies to a select handful of crops, distortion of the agricultural
market by artificially supporting only these select crops, and the slow, painful
death of small farming in the United States. This “death” has transformed rural
America into a wasteland of large commercialized farms and abandoned fields
that once served as symbols of hope to the families that depended on their
plentiful yields.
William S. Eubanks II, The Sustainable Farm Bill: A Proposal for Permanent Environmental
Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10493, 10495 (2009).
184. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (2012).
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Initiative,185 which subsidizes “agricultural… and forest products based
businesses.”186 Similarly, Massachusetts offers small grants to new farm
businesses.187 The program was implemented “to assist farmers whose
goal is to raise agricultural products and who aspire to develop their
farms into commercially viable operations.”188
Direct subsidies are generally not subject to invalidation under the
dormant Commerce Clause.189 However, the fact remains that subsidies
are discriminatory by nature because they provide a benefit to local
economic interests while excluding similarly situated out-of-state
competitors.190
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stopped short of declaring an
outright exception to the dormant Commerce Clause for direct business
subsidies.191 In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, the Court
invalidated a direct subsidy that was offered to Massachusetts dairy
producers, but in that case, the funding for the subsidies came
“principally from taxes on the sale of milk produced in other States.”192
In this way, the Court distinguished the subsidy at issue from “[a] pure
subsidy funded out of general revenue[, which] ordinarily imposes no
burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business.”193
The implication here is that subsidies are likely constitutional when they
are funded out of the state’s general treasury; the same is not true in
cases where the source of the funding “burdens interstate commerce.”194
Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that the funds for subsidies to
local farmers come from the general treasury of the state and not a tax
specifically linked to the benefit.195 States, and courts if the subsidies
185. Id.
186. Working Lands Enterprise Initiative: Purpose and Legislation, VERMONT.GOV,
http://workinglands.vermont.gov/wlei/working_lands_summary (last visited May 13, 2014).
187. Matching Enterprise Grants for Agriculture Program, MASS.GOV,
http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/agr/about/divisions/mega.html (last visited May 13, 2014).
188. Id.
189. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (“Direct
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce
Clause].”).
190. But see W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (explaining
that a “pure subsidy” provides a local economic benefit but does not impermissibly burden
interstate commerce).
191. “We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we
need not do so now.” Id. at 199 n.15 (1994).
192. Id. at 199.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. For an in-depth discussion of business subsidies and their treatment under the
dormant Commerce Clause, post-West Lynn Creamery, see Dan T. Coenen, Business
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are challenged, should look favorably to this option for promoting local
agriculture.
C.

Taxes on Goods Produced on Large Farms

Taxes in any form are generally analyzed carefully by courts when
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause.196
Some
discriminatory taxes are upheld,197 but often they are not.198 In light of
the fact that direct subsidization of local businesses is generally
permissible,199 disfavoring taxes that discriminate against out-of-state
interests may appear contradictory. Both selective subsidies and
discriminatory taxes have the effect of giving a financial advantage to
some participants in the marketplace, which inarguably puts other
participants at a disadvantage. Treating subsidies differently from taxes
appears to be a focus on form over substance.200 There is a lack of
clarity on this issue, which suggests that further guidance may be
required from the Court in the future before the outcome of dormant
Commerce Clause challenges will be reliably predictable. However,
there is ample jurisprudence for examining the current rules regarding
differential taxation by state governments.201
The primary fundamental question asked by courts is whether the
tax is discriminatory against out-of-state interests.202 If a tax is explicitly
levied only against agricultural goods produced out-of-state, then it will
be virtually per se invalid.203 It is almost impossible for any tax to
survive this standard of review.204 Therefore, if a state wishes for a tax
Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998).
196. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199 (deciding that the presence of a tax
triggers an analysis of whether a subsidy violates the dormant Commerce Clause).
197. See, e.g., supra note 165 and accompanying text.
198. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 265 (1984).
199. See supra Part III.B.
200. Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 196, 197-98 (2007), available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index.
php?id=7. Professor Zelinsky questions: “What, I respectfully ask, is the point of all of this?
Why are state subsidies constitutionally acceptable in the form of direct cash grants, but
become discriminatory protectionism when undertaken by means of economically equivalent
tax breaks?” Id. at 198-99.
201. See id.
202. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
203. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (“If a
restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.”).
204. See Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 574
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encouraging sustainable agriculture to pass constitutional muster, the tax
must be applied even-handedly to in-state and out-of-state interests.
A state tax may be crafted to exclude goods that meet specific
production standards of sustainability. For example, if produce is grown
without the use of synthetic chemical fertilizers, on a farm meeting very
high environmental standards, and transported using a minimal amount
of fossil fuels, then the producer may be exempt from the tax. A tax that
is structured in this way might not be facially discriminatory against outof-state interests, but implementation would be highly impractical. A
state would have to devote tremendous resources to evaluating the
claims of producers in order to ensure that those exempted meet the
stringent criteria.
In order to simplify the hypothetical tax structure, food produced on
small farms may be exempted. This would serve the purpose of
benefitting food that is produced more sustainably, because small farms
tend to employ more sustainable practices than large farms.205 It is
unclear how courts will respond to taxes that treat food produced on
small farms differently than food produced on large farms. Two
important factors to consider in predicting the constitutionality of such a
tax are the definition of “small” and whether the court will find that
small and large farms are differently situated business types.
The threshold for being taxed as a small farm could be determined
based on the income of the farm. The USDA defines small farms as
those earning less than $250,000 per year.206 Most farms in the U.S. are
small farms under this definition.207 In Massachusetts, for example, only
6.5% of farms would be taxed as large farms.208 However, since there is
a greater percentage of large farms outside the state than inside, the
burden of a discriminatory tax would fall disproportionately on out-of(1997) (“As the standard's name suggests, a discriminatory regulation will almost never
survive review under the virtual per se invalid standard of scrutiny.”).
205. For a discussion of how small farm practices tend to be more sustainable, see
D’Souza & Ikerd, supra note 43. “[T]he characteristics of small farms seem to most closely
resemble those of sustainable systems.” Id. at 82. See also supra Part I.C.
206. 7 C.F.R. § 4284.902 (2013).
207. According to the 2007 Agriculture Census, the USDA reported that 91% of all
U.S. farms were small farms. 2007 Census of Agriculture: Small Farms, U. S. DEPT. OF
AGRIC., at 1, http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/Fact_Shee
ts/Farm_Numbers/small_farm.pdf. Notably, 91% of farms only produced about 15% of the
total farm income in the U.S. in 2007. Id.
208. USDA NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., Tbl. 2. Market Value of Agricultural
Products Sold Including Landlord’s Share and Direct Sales: 2007 and 2002, 2007 CENSUS
VOLUME 1, CHAPTER 1: STATE LEVEL DATA (MASSACHUSETTS), http://www.agcensus.usda.g
ov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_State_Level/Massachusetts/st25_1_
002_002.pdf (last visited May 14, 2014).
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state interests. Furthermore, in-state sales by small farms are likely to be
primarily made by in-state small farms; therefore the benefits of being
exempt from the tax are disproportionately going to fall to in-state
interests.
For legislation to be found discriminatory under the dormant
Commerce Clause, the type of business being benefitted must be
similarly situated to the type of business being burdened.209 This
analysis considers whether the businesses are in competition with each
other and whether they receive a share of the market that shifts after the
legislation is enacted.210 It is likely that a court would consider small
farms to be similarly situated in comparison to large farms because small
and large farms compete for shares of the same food production market
and, moreover, different types of agricultural production have been held
to be similarly situated in the past.211
It is possible, however, that courts would reach a different outcome.
The typical point of sale for small farms is more frequently through
direct sale to consumers, while large farms are more likely to use an
intermediate channel, such as sales at a supermarket.212 This distinction
may not appear material on the surface; everybody needs to eat, so small
and large producers are certainly in competition for the same market.
But cable and satellite television providers are competing for increased
market share among television audiences, just like small and large food
producers are competing for increased market share among
consumers.213 In fact, from the point of view of the consumer, the
209. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187, 1201 (Ohio 2010) (“The problem
of comparing mismatched sets of ‘interstate players’ is answered by the requirement that the
favored and disfavored parties be similarly situated.”).
210. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997) (considering “actual or
prospective competition between the supposedly favored and disfavored entities” relevant to
whether a provision discriminates against interstate commerce).
211. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (“[A]s long as there is
some competition between the locally produced exempt products and non-exempt products
from outside the State, there is a discriminatory effect.”).
212. See Renée Johnson, Tadlock Cowan & Randy Alison Aussenberg, The Role of
Local Food Systems in U.S. Farm Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 6 (Jan. 20,
2012), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC
5097249.
213. Generally, companies seek an increase in market share. But see What is Market
Share?, WISE GEEK, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-market-share.htm (last visited May 14,
2014) (“Despite this, having a larger market share isn't always a good thing. It might not be
profitable if the increase is associated with expensive advertising or a big price decrease. A
company may not be able to meet the demand of an increased percentage of the market
without huge investments in new equipment and employees. Too much of an increase also
may not be beneficial if it violates a country's anti-trust laws. Additionally, if a company
values its share of the market above sustainable practices, it can cause big problems in the
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difference between cable and satellite television is similar to the
difference between points of sale for large and small food producers.
The argument that cable and satellite television providers are differently
situated business types has prevailed in courts,214 so it is also possible
that the argument would be successful regarding a tax that treats large
and small food producers differently.
It is difficult to assess a particular size above which a farm becomes
a differently situated business type, either based on annual income or
number of acres, for the purposes of establishing differential tax
treatment.215 Simply using the size threshold determined by the USDA
is an option.216 However, there is no evidence that all farms with
income greater than $250,000 each year are always less sustainable than
farms with income below that threshold. The opinion of one expert is
that “the farmer must ultimately decide how big a farm should be” to
remain sustainable.217 A large farm may employ practices that make it
relatively sustainable, while a small farm may employ practices that are
especially harmful to the environment. An arbitrary size threshold may
be a practical way to differentiate between sustainable and nonsustainable farms as different categories of businesses, but it is important
to recognize that it will not be a precise division. A court may determine
that the use of an arbitrary threshold to distinguish two types of
businesses fails; a farm that earns $251,000 per year is not necessarily a
different type of business from a farm that earns $249,000 per year.
A tax that applies to food produced on large farms, which would
exempt food produced on small farms, will face constitutional obstacles
under dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.218 Double food stamps at
farmers’ markets and direct subsidies to sustainable farming operations
are more likely to survive constitutional challenges.219
D.

Avoiding the Pitfalls of Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny

Because scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause can be, at
times, unpredictable, it is important that legislators take care to avoid
pitfalls that might send signals of economic protectionism to a court. It
long run.”).
214. See supra Part II.B.2.
215. See John Ikerd, How Big Should a Small Farm Be?, NAT’L SMALL FARM TODAY
CONF. AND TRADE SHOW (2002), available at http://web.missouri.edu/ikerdj/papers/SmFmHo
wBig.html#_ftn1.
216. See 7 C.F.R. § 4284.902 (2013).
217. Ikerd, supra note 215.
218. See supra, Part III.C.
219. See supra, Part III.A-B.
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is important, for example, that legislators do not put themselves on the
record as motivated to support legislation because of the local economic
benefits that come from shifting the market share to local producers.220
Avoiding statements suggesting that the intent of legislation is economic
protectionism can make it more difficult for a challenger to prove
discriminatory purpose.221
Furthermore, when supporting legislation, it is important to
recognize that extraterritorial benefits, meaning benefits that reach
outside of the jurisdiction enacting the legislation, are not within the
authority of local legislators.222 For example, sustainable practices in
Massachusetts may cause less environmental harm than industrial
practices in a faraway state; however, Massachusetts does not have the
authority to legislate to protect the environment in the faraway state.223
Instead, lawmakers should emphasize the local health, safety, and
environmental benefits that are promoted by legislation supporting
sustainable agriculture.224
From 1992 to 2005, the Supreme Court decided “thirteen major
dormant Commerce Clause cases,” ten of which invalidated the
challenged state actions.225 During that period, however, two Supreme
Court Justices evolved in their interpretation of the doctrine; both Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas have stood against the majority of the Court
and voted to uphold state laws when they are not facially
discriminatory.226 In fact, Justice Thomas appears to have rejected the
doctrine altogether, even dissenting to the decision in Granholm v.
Heald, which was admittedly discriminatory on its face, and later
dismissing the doctrine outright as “hav[ing] no basis in the Constitution
and . . . unworkable in practice.”227 Also notable, the Court has not
220. Smith, supra note 13, at 1241. But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384
(1968) (“We decline to void essentially on the ground that it . . . could be reenacted in its
exact form if the same or another legislator made a ‘wiser’ speech about it.”).
221. See supra note 130-132 and accompanying text.
222. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994)
(explaining that states do not have the power to regulate the environment outside state borders
because it is tantamount to regulating interstate commerce).
223. Id. (“Clarkstown [may not] justify the flow control ordinance as a way to steer
solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that it might deem harmful to the
environment. To do so would extend the town's police power beyond its jurisdictional
bounds.”).
224. See supra Part I.D.
225. David S. Day, The "Mature" Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
226. Id. at 51.
227. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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invalidated any cases under the dormant Commerce Clause since
Granholm v. Heald was decided in 2005.228 There are several new
members of the Court since Granholm was decided,229 but the Justices
most resistant to the dormant Commerce Clause, Justices Scalia and
Justice Thomas, are still serving.230 It has yet to be seen how the new
Roberts Court will approach dormant Commerce Clause issues.
We may have a while to wait, since the Court has denied recent
petitions for certiorari.231 With the inconsistent application of the
doctrine in circuit courts, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court will
address the inconsistency eventually, and it is possible that we will see a
trend that allows states to regulate in areas like sustainable agriculture
without being pre-empted by Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.232
CONCLUSION
The negative effects of industrialization can be mitigated when
food is produced on small farms and distributed locally. State and local
governments should embrace policies that promote sustainability in
agricultural production. The federal government may have preemptive
authority to regulate agriculture on the national level, but this is not a
complete barrier to states that want to encourage sustainable practices.
228. Few cases have gone before the Court since Granholm was decided, and
challengers have not succeeded in any of them. See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553
U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (upholding a tax on out-of-state bonds that did not apply to in-state
bonds under the market participant exception); United Haulers Ass'n., 550 U.S. 330
(upholding legislation that requires in-county disposal of waste at state run facilities under the
market participant exception); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545
U.S. 429 (2005) (upholding an annual fee placed on intrastate haulers, even though strictly
intrastate haulers are subject to the same fee as mixed haulers who do not receive the same
benefits of intrastate commerce as their strictly intrastate counterparts).
229. Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Court in 2005, followed by Justice Samuel
Alito in 2006, Justice Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, and Justice Elena Kagan in 2010. See
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited May 13, 2014).
230. Id.
231. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin, 941 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (2010), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 51 (2012).
232. Compare Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010)
(holding that a Massachusetts state statute favoring small wine producers over large producers
violates the dormant Commerce Clause), and S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d
583 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a South Dakota state statute favoring small farms over
incorporated farms violates the dormant Commerce Clause), with Black Star Farms LLC v.
Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that an Arizona statute favoring small wine
producers over large producers does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause), and Coors
Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 787 F. Supp. 2d 149, 172 (D.P.R. 2011), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 678 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a Puerto Rico statute favoring small
beer producers over large producers does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
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State and local governments have the ability to craft legislation that does
not violate the principles of the dormant Commerce Clause. Some forms
of legislation are likely to prevail against a constitutional challenge, like
programs that double the value of federal food stamps at farmers’
markets or programs that provide direct subsidies to small farms. Other
types of legislation, like differential tax treatment, may be less likely to
survive, but the unpredictable nature of the dormant Commerce Clause
means that the outcome is open-ended.
Chris Erchull
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